We present an improved statistical fluctuation analysis for measurement device independent quantum key distribution with three-intensity decoy-state method. After introducing some relations among different fluctuation ratios, we reanalysis the effect of statistical fluctuations and obtain more tight estimations. Based on this, we find that the key rate is improved by about 97% than the result given by Xu., et al. (Phys. Rev. A 89, 052333) in the case of data-size 10 12 for the distance 50km.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most successful applications of quantum information processing. QKD can provide unconditional security based on the laws of quantum physics [1, 2] . However, owing to the imperfections in real-life implementations of QKD, a large gap between its theory and practice remains unfilled. Security for real set-ups of QKD [1, 2] has become a major problem in this area recent years. The security loopholes for practical set-ups are mainly due to the imperfect single-photon source and the limited efficiency of the detectors. Fortunately, by using the decoy-state method [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , it has been shown that the unconditional security of QKD can still be assured with an imperfect single-photon source [14, 15] .
Besides the source imperfection, the defect in the detectors is another threaten to the security [16] . To patch up this, several approaches have been proposed. One is the device independent QKD (DI-QKD) [17] . This technique does not require detailed knowledge of how QKD devices work and can be proved secure.
Recently, an idea of measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea of entanglement swapping [18, 19] . The key idea of MDI-QKD is that both legitimate users, Alice and Bob, are senders. Neither Alice nor Bob performs any measurement, but only send out quantum signals to the un-trusted third party (UTP), who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement. After Alice and Bob send out signals, they wait for UTP's announcement of weather he has obtained a successful event after detection, and proceed to the standard postprocessing of their sifted data. The only assumption needed in MDI-QKD is that the preparation * Email Address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn of the quantum signal sources by Alice and Bob. By using the decoy-state method, Alice and Bob can use imperfect single-photon sources [19] [20] [21] . Hence, MDI-QKD can remove all detector side-channel attacks and is also practical for current technology. Owing to this, it has attracted a lot of scientific attention. So far, the decoy-state MDI-QKD has been studied by a number of scientists both experimentally [22] [23] [24] and theoretically [20, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] .
As is well known, in any real experiment, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by a finite-size key. Such an analysis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in practice set-ups. In precious works, the methods of standard error analysis is most commonly used [25] [26] [27] 36] . M. Curty et al. present a rigorous finite-key analysis with Chernoff bound in Ref. [30] . In all these works, the relations among the statistical fluctuation ratios are not considered sufficiently. Actually, as shown in this paper, the statistical ratios are interdependent from each other with a given security bound. By using these relations among the statistical fluctuation ratios, we present an improved statistical fluctuation analysis. Based on this, we obtain the more tight bounds of s and further processed for the final key. Since the imperfect single-photon sources can only be used in real set-ups, we need the decoy-state method for security in practice.
In the three-intensity decoy-state protocol, we assume Alice (Bob) has three different sources in each bases, say
respectively, where ω = X for X basis and ω = Z for Z basis. In photon number space, suppose
We shall consider the decoy-state method in each basis separately. For simplicity, we shall omit the superscripts ω of ρ xA , ρ xB , ρ yA , ρ yB and a k , a
k in what follows of this article provided that the omission does not cause any confusion. We request the states above satisfy the following very important condition
for k ≥ 2. The imperfect sources used in practice such as the coherent state source, the heralded source out of the parametric-down conversion, satisfy the above restrictions. Given a specific type of source, the above listed different states have different averaged photon numbers (intensities), therefore the states can be obtained by controlling the light intensities. At each time, Alice will randomly choose source ρ lA with probability p lA and ω basis with probability p ω|lA for l = o, x, y. Similarly, Bob will randomly choose source ρ rB with probability p rB and ω basis with probability p ω|rB for r = o, x, y. The pulse from Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and are sent to UTP. We regard equivalently that each time a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse pair (one pulse from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emitted. For postprocessing, Alice and Bob evaluate the data sent in two bases separately. The Z-basis is used for key generations, while the X-basis is used for testing against tampering and the purpose of quantifying the amount of privacy amplification needed. Here, we use the capital letters Z(X) for the bases and the lowercase letters o, x, y for the different sources. Here and after, we omit the subscripts A and B without causing any ambiguity. In order to calculate the secret final key rate of this protocol, we need the lower bound of the yield s Z 11 and the upper bound of the error rate e X 11 .
A. Asymptotic case
As shown in Ref. [20] , we denote lr as the two-pulse source when Alice uses source l and Bob uses r, and l, r can take o, x, y. For example, two-pulse source oy denote the case when Alice use vacuum source ρ o and Bob uses the signal source ρ y . There are 9 two-pulse sources lr in each bases of the three-intensity decoy-state method. We also denote S lr as the yield of two-pulse source lr. S lr are observed values and will be regarded as known values here. However, the yields s lr mn for the two-pulses states |m m| ⊗ |n n| out of source lr cannot be directly observed. In the asymptotic case, we assume that s lr mn for all lr are the same and we can denote all of them by s mn , i.e.
Given this, we can formulate the very important unknown variable s 11 by using constraints
if the state for the two-pulse source lr is
In Refs. [20, 31] , we presented some explicit formulas for the practical decoy-state implementation through using part of the above constraints. Explicitly, we rewrite these formulas into its equivalent forms that are shown in Appendix A.
B. Non-asymptotic case
In any real experiment, the total pulses sent by Alice and Bob are finite. So the number of sifted keys is always finite. In order to extract the secure final key, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by the finite-size key. This is to say, yields of the same two-pulse state out of different sources are different, i.e.,
In such a case, there are too many variants {s lr mn }. To obtain the lower bound value for s 11 and upper bound value for e 11 , one can implement the idea of Ref. [13] . Definê s mn as the mean value of yield of state |mn produced by all sources used in the decoy-state method,
Based on this, we can also define quantitŷ
Replacing S lr byŜ lr in Eq. (5), we obtain formulate the lower bound ofŝ 11 . Note that even though S lr are known values directly observed in an experiment,Ŝ lr are not. However, given the values S lr and N lr , we havê
With a probability larger than 1 − ǫ, δ lr is in the range of
In a Ref. [13] , n δ is set to be 10. Here in this paper we shall set
which corresponds to ǫ = 10 −7 [30, 36] in our numerical simulation, so as to make a fair comparison with [36] . Therefore, we can formulate the lower bound value ofŝ 11 byŜ lr . Similarly, one can also work out the averaged value ofê mn being the error yields. Details of all these can be seen in Appendix B. In the calculation, previous work [36] used the worst-case values for each individual δ lr in Eqs. (9, 10) .
Here in this work, instead of using this simple worstcase calculation, we propose a more efficient method to treat the statistical fluctuations in the decoy-state MDI-QKD. In our method, we don't have to consider the fluctuation of each quantities separately. For example, in estimating the quantityê X 11 in Eq.(B11), in a symmetric protocol where a 0 = b 0 , we need to calculate bound of T 0x + T x0 . The simple worst-case result would calculate the worst-case fluctuation for T x0 and T 0x separately. However, we can treat this more efficiently by considering the statistical fluctuations jointly. Say, we regard sources S 0x and S x0 as one source 0x + x0 which emits state 1 2 (ρ 0x + ρ x0 ). For such a source, the error yield T x0 + T 0x = 2T 0x+x0 . We then only need to consider the fluctuation for only one quantity T 0x+x0 . This will improve the performance of the decoy-state protocol. In the next section we present a systematic study of this joint constraints in the statistical fluctuation.
III. IMPROVED STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS
In order to estimate the lower bound of s works, the relations among these fluctuation ratios have not been considered sufficiently. In this section, we will introduce some relations among these ratios firstly. With these relations, we show the improved formulas to estimate the lower bound of s which can help us to extract the secret final key with a higher rate.
A. Relations among the fluctuation ratios
When we do the statistical fluctuation analysis, we need to choose a proper security bound firstly. With a given definite security bound, we can bound the fluctuation ratios δ ω lr and τ X lr by Eq.(B3) and Eq.(B4) respectively. In order to obtain the relations among these fluctuation ratios, we need to reconsider the grouping of the successful events announced by UTP.
For the sake of clarity, we consider the relation between δ respectively. These two observable are corresponding to the successful events with source pairs (l 1 , r 1 ) and (l 2 , r 2 ). If we group all the successful events of these two types together, and denote J 2 = {(l 1 , r 1 ), (l 2 , r 2 )}, the value of the yield iŝ 
In this relation,
is the number of successful events announced by UTP when Alice and Bob use source pairs in J 2 in the ω basis. Reconsidering the definition of S ω J2 , we know that
Now we take into account the mean values. The above relation can be written into
Then we can find out the relations between these two ratios δ ω l1r1 and δ ω l2r2
where Eq. (14) has been used. Generally, we can group the successful events of any source pairs together. In order to see more clearly, we define the set J ab = {(l, r)|l, r = o, x, y} to collect all the source pairs chosen by Alice and Bob in the threeintensity decoy-state protocol. Furthermore, we define (16) to collect all subsets J m of J ab , where J m contains m different source pairs in it. For example, J 1 = {{(l 1 , r 1 )}|l 1 , r 1 = o, x, y} which collects all subsects of J ab with only one source pair in each element, J 2 = {{(l 1 , r 1 ), (l 2 , r 2 )}|l 1 , r 1 , l 2 , r 2 = o, x, y; (l 1 , r 1 ) = (l 2 , r 2 )} which collects all subsets of J ab with two different source pairs in each element, and J 9 = {J ab } which contains the set J ab as its sole element. With these preparations, we can write all the relations among the ratios δ ω lr into
for all J m ∈ J m , m = 1, 2, · · · , 8 and
The lase equation is deduced from the fact that
Specially, if we set m = 1, then the relations presented in Eq. (17) 9 −9−1 = 502 joint constraints for these 9 ratios. It is a hard work to obtain an explicit formula to estimate the lower bound ofŝ 11 from Eq.(10) with all these constraints. In the next subsection, we will present some explicit formulas to lower boundŝ Z 11 and upper boundê X 11 with an efficient method by introducing some more generalized constraints. Though in our formulas we have not used all constraints, our formulas can give a key rate almost exactly the same with the one fully using all these constraints.
Similarly, all the relations among the fluctuation ratios τ X lr can be written into
Specially, if we set m = 1, then the relations presented in Eq. (19) is just the bounds for each fluctuation ratios τ X lr which has been shown in Eq.(B4).
B. Improved statistical fluctuation analysis
Practically, in order to extract the secret final key, we need to consider the statistical fluctuation caused by a finite-size key. Such an analysis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in real setups. As concluded in previous works [25-27, 30, 36] , comparing with the asymptotic result, the final key rate will be evidently decreased in a reasonable data-size in the situation with finite-size key, such as N t = 10
12 . So it is very important to introduce some more efficient methods to reanalysis the finite-size effect.
As discussed previously, in statistical analysis, the fluctuation ratios should be used, such as δ ω lr and τ X lr defined in Eq.(B1) and Eq.(B2) respectively. The lower and upper bounds of these ratios can be fixed with a given security bound. Besides the bound relations for these ratios, we have shown some other relations among them without changing the security bound. In all previous works [25-27, 30, 36] , the relations among these ratios have not been considered sufficiently. Here in this subsection, we make some improved statistical analysis with the relations presented above.
We consider the estimation of lower bound of s 
where
with
11 being constant factors which are defined in Eq.(A2).
In order to obtain the proper estimation of the lower bound of s 11 , we need to find out the worst case under the constraints about the ratios δ . These optimization problems can be solved by using the linear programming (LP) method. In Appendix C, we show the improved LP method with our joint constraints for the statistical fluctuation ratios above.
In the above subsection, we introduce some relations among these fluctuation ratios by regrouping the successful events. Actually, by taking partial successful events of each group randomly, we can generalize these relations. That is to say, the relation in Eq. (17) 
where λ ω lr ≤ 1. With these generalized relations, we can find out some explicit formulas to estimate the bounds.
Firstly, we commit ourself to derive an explicit formula to estimate the minimization of S . That is to say, if a
, we use nature numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 to indicate xx, oy ,yo and oo respectively. With these preparations, we can rewrite S ω,fa + into the following form
where λ (j) j = 1, and
Furthermore, in the above equation, we always rearrange the subscript number with increasing order to make sure that h
According to the generalized constraints presented in Eq. (24), we obtain that
Then the minimum of S ω,fa + can be estimate by using the following explicit formula
Similarly, we can estimate the maximum of S ω,fa − by the following explicit formula
where λ
are defined in Eq. (26) with initial values h
In the same way, we can estimation the minimum of S ω,f b + and the maximum of S ω,f b − by using the following explicit formulas
where λ (j) k and h (j) k are defined in Eq. (26) with initial values h with Eqs. (28,29,30 ), we always rearrange the subscript number with increasing order to make sure that h
With these preparations, we obtain a lower bound of s 
are defined in Eq. (26) with initial values h (33,34) , we always rearrange the subscript number with increasing order to make sure that h
Here g lr are defined in Appendix A.
Combining these two lower bound, we obtain our improved estimation of the lower bound of s 
where s Similarly, we can use the same method to obtain an improved formula to estimate the upper bound of e 11 . That is e X,f 11 =ê
whereê X 11 is a constant factor which is defined in Eq.(A4), s X,f 11 is the lower bound of s 11 in X-basis given by Eq. (35) and T X + , T X − can be analytically obtained as follows
k are defined in Eq. (26) with initial values h
where λ (37,38) , we always rearrange the subscript number with increasing order to make sure that h
So far we have completed our analytical formulas. To evaluate these formulas, we shall compare the key rate from these formulas with that from a method which fully uses all those 502 constraints. In Appendix C, we develop such a method with linear programming (LP). There we shall first reduce those 502 constraints to only 11 or even less. Based on this, we can estimate the lower bound of s 
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we will present some numerical simulations to compare the results obtained with the improved methods and the traditional methods. Without losing the generality, we focus on the symmetric case where the two channel transmissions from Alice to UTP and from Bob to UTP are equal. We also assume that the UTP's detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rates and detection efficiencies, and their detection efficiencies do not depend on the incoming signals. We shall estimate what values would be probably observed for the yields and error yields in the normal cases by the linear models as in [5, 19, 35] . For fair comparison, we use the same experimental parameters used in Ref. [36] for our numerical simulation, which are mostly from the long-distance QKD experiment reported in [38] . The values of these parameters are listed in Table I. With this, the yields S ω lr and error yields T X lr can be calculated [35] with coherent states with intensities µ o , µ x , µ y . The density matrix of the coherent state with intensity µ can be written into ρ = k e −µ µ k k! |k k|. By using these values, we can estimate the lower bounds of s Z 11 and the upper bounds of e X 11 with different methods presented in the above sections. With these preparations, we can calculate the final secret key rate with the following formula [19] 
where S Z yy and E Z yy denote, respectively, the yield and error rate in the Z-basis when both Alice and Bob use ρ yA and ρ yB ; f e is the efficiency factor of the error correction To make a fair comparison, we need to find out the full parameter optimizations for different methods [36] . Here we also use the well-known local search algorithm. In this algorithm, we need to optimize the one-variable nonlinear function in each step for the local search.
We consider the three-intensity protocol in the case of data-size N t = 10
12 . The optimal parameters and the practical key rate per pulse for the distance 50km (standard fiber), with the statistical fluctuations, are shown in Table II . The result presented in Ref. [36] is shown in the 2nd column. In the 3rd column, we show the optimal parameters after a full parameter optimization by using the traditional analytical method with Eq.(B9) and Eq.(B10). In the 4th column, we present the results after a full parameter optimization by using the improved analytical method with explicit formulas in Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) . We can see that our new optimal key rate with full parameter optimization is better than the result presented in Ref. [36] . The improvement of the optimal final key rate R is about 97%. In Ref. [36] , the lowest intensity is 10 −6 which is too small to be obtained exactly in real experimental. On the other hand, the optimal key rates obtained by setting the lowest intensity to be 0 or 10
respectively are nearly equal to each other. Furthermore, the improved method considered in this paper can apply to the generalized situation that the lowest intensity is not 0 [33] . In Table III , we show the optimal parameters and the practical key rate per pulse for the distance 100km (standard fiber) with the statistical fluctuations. In the 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns, we present the results after a full parameter optimization by using the traditional method, the improved method with formulas and the improved LP method with our joint constraints for statistical fluctuations.
More extensive comparison results are shown in Fig.1 . In this figure, we show the optimal key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance under a practical setting with finite data-set N t = 10
12 . From  Fig.1 one can see that our formulated results are almost identical with our linear programming which has fully used all 502 constraints of fluctuation ratios. Comparison of parameters at 50km (standard fiber) for 3-intensity protocol with statistical fluctuation analysis in the case of data-size Nt = 10 12 . The 2nd column is the result presented in Ref. [36] . The 3rd column is the optimal parameters after a full parameter optimization with explicit formulas Eq.(B9) and Eq.(B10). The 4th column is the optimal parameters obtained with explicit formulas Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) . Comparing with the result given by Xu et al [36] , our improved result raises the key rate R by 97%. The 2nd column is the optimal parameters after a full parameter optimization with explicit formulas Eq.(B9) and Eq.(B10). The 3rd column is the optimal parameters obtained by our improved method with explicit formulas Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) . The 4th column is the optimal parameters obtained by our improved linear programming method with our constraints shown in appendix C. We can see that our new full parameter optimization can improve the key rate R by 146%. Our improved results by formulas are almost the same with our LP method which has fully used all constraints of fluctuation ratios.
V. CONCLUSION
In real set-ups of MDI-QKD, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by the finite-size key. In the statistical analysis, we need to introduce the fluctuation ratios. With import the relations among these fluctuation ratios, we obtain the improved statistical analysis with explicit formulas. According to the numerical simulations. The results obtained with our improved methods are significantly better than the results obtained with the traditional methods. In our study, we have taken the same intensities in both bases. The result can be further improved by taking different intensity values in different bases and taking the decoy-state method in only one basis as pointed out in [32] . This will be reported elsewhere. In Ref. [20] , Wang presented the first explicit formula for the practical decoy-state implementation through using part of the above constraints. Explicitly, we can use the following formula to estimate the lower bound of s 
wherê s ω,a Besides this formula, we also present some other methods to estimate the lower bounds of s ω 11 for this threeintensity protocol [31] . Explicitly, the lower bound of s ω 11 can be estimated by the following explicit formulâ
With the condition presented in Eq.(3), we can easily prove that f lr ≥ 0 for all l, r = o, x, y.
As presented in Ref. [31] , we know that the lower boundŝ ω,2 11 is always better thanŝ ω,2 11 in the asymptotic case. Whereas, in the non-asymptotic case, we need reanalysis the relation between them. Actually, the priority ofŝ ω,2 11 will disappear in the case of reasonable data-size for a long enough key distribution distance.
Besides the lower bound of s ω 11 , we can estimate the upper bound of e X 11 with the following explicit formulâ
wherê 
respectively, where N ω lr is the number of pulses sent out by Alice and Bob when they use sources ρ lA and ρ rB in the ω basis respectively, n δ and n τ are the number of standard deviations one chooses for statistical fluctuation analysis with the given security bound. With these notations, we know that N Similarly, in this 3-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol, we can use the following explicit formula to estimate the upper bound of e As was shown in [36] , the existing linear programming (LP) method with the worst-case treatment [25] will only produce a very limited key rate and secure distance. It has a better performance when full optimization is taken. Here we consider both full optimization and our joint constraints. As shown in previously, the estimations of the lower bound of s ω 11 and the upper bound of e X 11 can be obtained by solving some linear programming problems. As discussed in subsection III A, these are 502 constraints about ratios δ ω lr . Though we can solve this problem with LP method directly, but it will spend too much time. To make it more efficiently, we shall first reduce those 502 constraints to only 11 or even fewer equivalent constraints.
Firstly, we consider the minimization of S 
